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Abstract: 
In this paper we examine the effect of the income tax on charitable giving. An important 
challenge in this literature has been to estimate the long-run response of giving to a 
persistent change in tax-price, which can be difficult to distinguish from intertemporal 
substitution arising from differences between current and expected future tax prices, 
arising for example due to transitory fluctuations in incomes, life-cycle factors, or pre-
announced tax reforms. Several papers that have attempted to distinguish these effects 
have found that the elasticity of charitable giving with respect to a persistent price change 
is small, while the elasticity with respect to a transitory difference between current and 
expected future prices is large. Auten, Sieg, and Clotfelter (2002) advance this literature 
by developing an estimation procedure that incorporates a more sophisticated model of 
the stochastic process for income.  In contrast to previous research on the topic, they find 
the counterintuitive result that the immediate response to a persistent price change is 
much larger than the immediate response to a one-period transitory price change. In this 
paper, we present a new estimation procedure that allows us to implement their 
assumptions about the stochastic process of income in a more conventional regression 
framework, and then adapt the procedure to take into account the pre-announced and 
phased-in nature of tax reforms that occurred during the sample period. In preliminary 
analysis based on a public-use panel of individual tax return data, we are able to replicate 
their counterintuitive pattern of price elasticities, and find that incorporating information 
about pre-announced and phased-in tax law changes reverses their result – the persistent 
price elasticity is reduced substantially, and the transitory price elasticity is now the 
larger of the two.  We also try an instrumental variables strategy that relies exclusively on 
federal and state tax reforms for identification, and this yields similar results. Finally, we 
incorporate a dynamic adjustment process into the empirical specification, and find 
evidence that the long-run response to persistent price and income changes is larger than 
the immediate response.      
 
PRELIMINARY: PLEASE DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION  1
Introduction 
 
  In the United States, the federal government and most state governments offer a 
price subsidy for charitable giving, in the form of a deduction against income tax for 
taxpayers who itemize. In this way, the marginal cost (or “tax price”) of a charitable 
contribution relative to non-deductible consumption is reduced from one to one minus the 
marginal income tax rate.  The role of this price subsidy in encouraging charitable giving 
has long been a topic of political debate. For instance, the creation of the standard 
deduction in 1944 was opposed because of a fear that it would reduce charitable 
donations.
1 More recently, the issue has come up in the context of tax reform plans that 
would limit or eliminate deduction (for example, the initial proposal that led to the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986, and the Hall-Rabushka “flat tax”), and the recent Bush 
administration proposal to extend the deduction to non-itemizers.
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  The sensitivity of charitable contributions to the price subsidy provided by the 
income tax has been the subject of extensive empirical research among economists, in 
part because economic theory suggests that the optimal size of subsidy for charitable 
giving depends positively on the degree of responsiveness to the subsidy. Contributions 
to charitable organizations may be thought of as a form of private consumption. After all, 
the contribution would not be made voluntarily if doing so did not yield some utility to 
the donor -- for example, a “warm glow” feeling, as in Andreoni (1990). But a charitable 
contribution may also involve some public good aspect or positive externality, where the 
benefit to society is greater than the benefit to the donor at the margin. In that case, some 
form of price subsidy to charitable giving may be justified on efficiency grounds.  It has 
long been recognized that in an optimal tax framework, the efficient rate of subsidy for a 
good with a positive externality is an increasing function of the price elasticity of demand 
for that good (Sandmo, 1975).  Intuitively, the efficient subsidy rate is the Pigouvian 
subsidy rate (which depends on the size of the marginal external benefit at the efficient 
quantity), minus an optimal tax rate, and the latter becomes smaller when demand for the 
good is more responsive to price. Saez (2004) shows that this same positive relationship 
between the optimal subsidy and the price elasticity continues to hold in a richer model 
that allows for direct government provision of the same public good supported by the   2
charity, crowding out of private contributions by public provision, and social welfare 
function that puts positive weight on redistribution towards the poor. Thus, a good 
estimate of the price elasticity of charitable giving would be a particularly useful piece of 




  Efforts to estimate the sensitivity of charitable giving to its price face a number of 
difficult challenges. An especially important concern is that current prices and disposable 
incomes may differ in a systematic way from their expected future values. Such 
differences may occur for three main reasons: fluctuations in pre-tax income that are 
known by the taxpayer to be transitory; changes in tax law that are pre-announced or 
gradually phased in over time; and variation over time in income arising from life-cycle 
factors, economy-wide productivity trends, and other influences that are predictable with 
some degree of error.  Each of these three factors may affect price as well as income. Any 
predictable difference between current and future income can also produce a predictable 
difference between current and future price by pushing the taxpayer into a different 
marginal tax rate bracket. On the price side, all of these factors create opportunities for 
intertemporal substitution – taxpayers have a strong incentive to give to charity during 
those years when their marginal tax rates are temporarily high (and thus the price of 
giving is low).  In the cross section, we observe that people with low prices give more to 
charity, but this may partly reflect people substituting giving from other years when they 
face higher prices, and thus does not necessarily indicate any increase in the total amount 
of lifetime giving in response to tax incentives. On the income side, Milton Friedman’s 
permanent income hypothesis (1957) suggests that consumption should respond more 
weakly to a transitory fluctuation in income than to a persistent change in lifetime 
income. Since current income is a mixture of transitory and permanent components, 
income elasticities based on cross-sectional data would tend to be downwardly biased 
estimates of the effect of a persistent change in income. 
  Figure 1 offers a stylized illustration of the problem.  In the top panel, the bold 
black line a-b represents a predictable life-cycle pattern of disposable income for an   3
individual, and the dashed line around a-b represents fluctuations of disposable income 
along that life-cycle pattern that are known by the individual to be temporary at the time 
they occur.  Ideally, we would like to have data on the expected present value of lifetime 
resources, which the permanent income hypothesis would suggest is an important 
determinant of current consumption decisions. Instead, what we typically observe in the 
data is current income, the height of the dashed line around a-b, which may be only 
weakly related to the present value of lifetime resources.  On the income side, for policy 
purposes, we are generally most interested in identifying the elasticity of charitable 
giving with respect to a permanent change in disposable income. This would be helpful, 
for example, in an effort to estimate how a tax reform that affects disposable income in a 
persistent way would affect charitable giving. Conceptually, we would like to identify 
persistent shocks to disposable income that shift the whole life-cycle profile of disposable 
income, illustrated by the upward shift to line segment c-d that occurs at time t in the top 
panel of Figure 1. The response of charitable giving to such a shock would tell us 
something about the effects of a tax reform that changes disposable income in a persistent 
way.  Changes in disposable income arising from the transitory fluctuations along the 
long-run profile, as well as changes due to predictable life-cycle patterns, may not be 
associated with any change in the expected present value of lifetime resources, and thus 
we would like to distinguish those sorts of changes from the kind of change illustrated by 
the shift to line c-d. 
  The bottom panel of Figure 1 illustrates how similar considerations apply to price. 
The predictable life-cycle path of prices is inversely related to the pattern of income. 
Because of the progressivity of the income tax, those periods of life when income is 
highest are also the periods when marginal tax rates are highest, and thus the price of 
charitable giving is lowest.  The bold black line e-f represents the predictable life-cycle 
pattern of prices, and the dashed line around it represents fluctuations in price that are 
known to be transitory at the time they occur.  Three types of opportunities to reduce 
taxes through intertemporal substitution are illustrated here. First, taxpayers may want to 
concentrate their giving during the portion of the life cycle when the price of giving is the 
lowest (coinciding with the time when income is the highest). Second, taxpayers may 
want to concentrate giving into years when transitory income fluctuations make the price   4
temporarily low (represented by the dips in the dashed line). Third, suppose that a tax 
reform that permanently increases the price of giving (represented by the upward shift in 
the whole time path of prices to line g-h) is implemented at time t. If this tax reform were 
announced in advance at time t-1, this would create a strong incentive to accelerate 
charitable giving into year t-1, in anticipation of the future price increase. Conceptually, 
we would like to distinguish these various sorts of intertemporal substitution behavior 
from the long-run response of giving to the shift in the whole path of prices occurring at 
time t illustrated in the figure. It is this latter response that is most interesting from a 
policy perspective, as it is the size of this response that is relevant to determining the 
optimal degree of subsidy to charity. 
  There is well-known and striking time-series evidence of intertemporal 
substitution of charitable giving among very high-income individuals in anticipation of 
the implementation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86), suggesting this is an 
important concern. TRA86 was enacted in October of 1986, and its provisions were 
gradually phased-in between 1987 and 1988. The act reduced the marginal income tax 
rate in the top bracket from 50 percent to 28 percent, and also amended the alternative 
minimum tax base to include any accumulated capital gains on charitable donations of 
appreciated property (the latter provision was eliminated for tangible property in 1991, 
and for all property in 1993). Both of these created a strong incentive for high-income 
people to accelerate charitable donations into 1986, before the aforementioned provisions 
began to take effect.  Indeed, towards the end of 1986, the financial press ran stories 
advising readers to make any large charitable donations before the end of 1986 rather 
than waiting (see for example, Simpson, 1986). Figure 2 illustrates how charitable giving 
changed as a share of 10-year average income between 1979 and 1988 for taxpayers in 
different 10-year average income classes (from data reported in Auten, Cilke, and 
Randolph, 1992).  There is clear evidence of an enormous spike in giving in 1986 among 
taxpayers with persistently high incomes. Among millionaires (in 1991 dollars), giving 
surged from 12.3 percent to 20.4 percent of 10-year average income between 1985 and 
1986, and then dropped back to 12.3 percent in 1987. There is no obvious alternative 
explanation, aside from intertemporal substitution in response to an anticipated price 
increase, for this 1986 spike. The figure also makes clear that only very-high-income   5
taxpayers exhibited a large degree of intertemporal substitution. For instance, even those 
with incomes between $100,000 and $200,000 barely registered a blip in giving in 1986. 
This may be explained by the fact that the expected change in marginal tax rates was 
smaller for this group, and because they were less likely to face the alternative minimum 
tax. There may also be some difference in the size of the transitory price elasticity 
between this group and the highest income group. In any event, it suggests that 
controlling for year dummies will not remove this effect from an econometric analysis, 
and that timing in response to pre-announced tax changes is likely to be particularly 
important in data that heavily oversamples high-income people, as has been the case with 
much of the recent literature. 
  While TRA86 is the most dramatic example of an incentive to re-time charitable 
contributions, there have in fact been numerous other examples of this phenomenon.
3 The 
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 reduced the top marginal rate from 70 percent to 50 
percent and eventually reduced all other marginal rates by 23 percent of their former 
levels. This law was enacted in August of 1981, but only implemented minor rate 
reductions in 1981 (except for an immediate reduction in the capital gains rate) – the bulk 
of rate reductions were gradually phased in between 1981 and 1984. The 1990 Omnibus 
Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA90), enacted in November 1990, increased the 
marginal rate in the top bracket to 31 percent, and also imposed a limitation on itemized 
deductions for high-income taxpayers – both provisions were implemented beginning in 
1991. An increase in the top marginal rate to 39.6 percent was enacted in 1993, applying 
retroactively to the beginning of 1993. Although the tax increase was not officially 
enacted in 2002, it was likely anticipated by the end of 2002 due to Clinton’s victory in 
the November Presidential election. There is substantial evidence that high-income 
taxpayers accelerated realization of income (for instance, bonuses and exercises of stock 
options) into 1992 in anticipation of the 1993 tax increases (Goolsbee, 2000). 
  Another set of challenges in estimating the responsiveness of charitable giving to 
taxes arises because of the potential for omitted variable bias and specification error. 
First, influences on charitable behavior such as education, alumni affiliation, degree of 
religiosity, and personal generosity are generally omitted from available data. These are 
likely to be associated with income in a non-linear fashion, and thus may introduce   6
omitted variable bias into the estimates of both income and price effects. To the extent 
that these omitted variables are time-invariant, this problem may be addressed with panel 
data, through the use of fixed effects or differencing.  In addition, as Feenberg (1987) has 
pointed out, the marginal federal income tax rate in any given year is a non-linear 
function of income and a few other variables (such as marital status) that may also 
influence giving independently.  As a result, in a cross sectional analysis, the separate 
identification of the price and income effects depends almost entirely on the non-linear 
relationship between the two. The true functional form of the relationships among giving, 
price, and income cannot be known with certainty, and if the functional form used for 
estimation is incorrect, estimated price and income elasticities may be biased because 
each estimate may partly reflect the effects of non-linear functions of the other.  Because 
federal and state tax reforms cause changes in tax rates that are independent of changes in 
income over time, panel data estimators that rely on these sorts of changes for 
identification, and remove the identification caused by the cross-sectional non-linear 
relationship between income and price, may be more robust to this potential source of 
bias. 
  A third kind of complication arises because the response of charitable giving to a 
change in income or price may be gradual.  One reason is that charitable giving may 
exhibit habit formation, where giving in one period may be positively related to giving in 
previous periods. For example, suppose a tax reform reduces the price of charitable 
giving, and this causes individuals to initially increase their giving by some small 
amount. This may in turn lead to further increases in giving in the future, for instance 
because each donor begins to develop relationships additional charitable organizations, 
becomes the target of greater fundraising activity, and so forth. Another possibility is that 
when a shock to income or price occurs in one period, it may take several subsequent 
periods of information for an individual to determine whether the shock is going to be 
permanent or transitory. In either case, the long-run steady state response to a change in 
price or income may exceed the immediate response. 
 
 
   7
Prior research 
 
  Early empirical literature on the effects of income taxes on charitable giving 
typically involved regressions on single-year cross-sectional data where the dependent 
variable was log charitable giving, and explanatory variables included the log tax-price, 
log disposable income, and a vector of demographic characteristics. Using this approach, 
Clotfelter and Steuerle (1981) estimated a price elasticity of -1.27 and an income 
elasticity of 0.78, a result that Clotfelter (1985) finds to be representative of the results in 
a very extensive literature of this type. These early studies, however, are particularly 
vulnerable to the problems discussed above. 
  Several empirical studies have addressed at least some significant subset of the 
challenges discussed above using panel data sets of individual income tax returns, taking 
advantage of the large changes in tax law during the 1980s to help identify their models. 
Early examples include Broman (1989), Barrett (1991), Randolph (1995), and Barrett, 
McGuirk, and Steinberg (1997, henceforth BMS).
4 Estimates in these studies generally 
suggest that elasticity of giving with respect to a persistent price change is small, while 
the elasticity with respect to a transitory fluctuation in price is large, implying that people 
are more willing to change the timing of their giving than the long-run level of their 
giving in response to tax incentives.  Among these studies, Randolph and BMS provide 
the most complete treatment of the issues discussed above. 
  Randolph estimates his model on a 1979-1988 panel of individual tax returns that 
heavily over-samples high-income returns, and uses the charity expenditure share (price 
times giving divided by disposable income) as the dependent variable. He treats current-
year price and disposable income as measurements with error of their permanent values, 
and uses 10-year average pre-tax income, interacted with dummies for time periods 
representing different tax regimes (1979-80, 1983-85, 1987-88) as the instruments for 
predicting the permanent components of current income and price.  Transitory 
fluctuations in price and income are then identified based on the difference between 
current and ten-year average pre-tax incomes, again interacted with tax regime dummies. 
Data for 1979-80 and 1986 are dropped from Randolph’s analysis because of substantial 
differences between current and announced future tax law during these years, an issue for   8
which Randolph’s procedure offers no solution. Because the instruments for predicting 
permanent income and price rely so heavily on a time-invariant variable (the individual’s 
ten-year average income), Randolph estimates a random effects rather than fixed effects 
model. When evaluated at the mean charity expenditure share for his sample, Randolph’s 
estimates imply an elasticity of giving with respect to permanent price of -0.08, and an 
elasticity of giving with respect to a transitory deviation in price of -2.27.
5 
  BMS estimate a log-linear fixed effects model on years 1979-86 of the University 
of Michigan public use panel of individual income tax returns. To address the possibility 
of intertemporal substitution, they include price from the current period, one period 
ahead, and one period lagged as explanatory variables. Similarly, current, one period 
ahead, and one period lagged values of disposable income are included in an effort to 
distinguish the effects of persistent and transitory changes in income. Lagged giving is 
included as an explanatory variable to address the possibility of gradual adjustment. They 
estimate a transitory price elasticity of -1.18, and a long-run permanent price elasticity of 
-0.47.  Adjustment to price and income changes is found to occur quickly, as the 
estimated coefficient on lagged giving is only 0.16.
6   
  The main contribution to this literature by Auten, Sieg and Clotfelter (2002) (ASC 
hereafter) is to develop an estimation procedure that allows income to follow a more 
reasonable stochastic process over time. The prior literature typically used averages of 
income from both past and future years, lagged averages of income, or the next year’s 
actual income as proxies for expected values of future income. As ASC point out, these 
approaches involve restrictive assumptions about how the persistent and transitory 
components of income evolve over time, and may mischaracterize that process.  For 
instance, in Randolph’s procedure, because the instrument for permanent income does 
not change over time except when there is a change in tax regime, and then only in the 
same way for everyone who has the same average income, many unanticipated persistent 
shocks to income will be mischaracterized as transitory shocks, and this will lead to 
similar mischaracterization of persistent price shocks as transitory. In addition, many of 
these approaches assume that individuals have precise knowledge in advance of actual 
future values of income (which would be necessary, for example, to calculate a 10-year 
average of income that includes future years of income).   9
  ASC begin by regressing change in log disposable income, change in log price, 
and change in log giving on demographic and life-cycle characteristics and year 
dummies, and then proceed to analyze the residuals from each of these regressions. They 
assume that residual log disposable income consists of a persistent component that 
follows a random walk, and a transitory component that is pure white noise. Persistent 
and transitory changes in residual log price are assumed to be linear functions of 
persistent and transitory income changes, respectively, plus permanent and transitory 
shocks that are independent of income and follow a similar stochastic process to income. 
Change in residual log giving is then assumed to be a linear function of persistent and 
transitory shocks to residual log price and residual log disposable income. The 
assumptions about the stochastic processes, together with the coefficients in the assumed 
linear relationships among the variables, imply a particular pattern of covariances among 
the contemporaneous and one-period lagged residual first-differenced values of log 
giving, log disposable income, and log price.  ASC then estimate the parameters of the 
model using a minimum distance estimator, which chooses the parameters of the model 
to minimize the difference between the covariance structure implied by those parameters, 
and the empirical covariance structure estimated from the sample.  Their model is 
estimated on essentially the same data set that Randolph used, extended forward to 1993, 
and all variables are first-differenced to control for unobserved heterogeneity.  
  In contrast to virtually all of the previous literature that addresses intertemporal 
substitution and unobserved heterogeneity in charitable giving, the estimates in ASC 
imply that the persistent price elasticity is large, generally larger than -1 (although this 
depends to some extent on the sample period chosen, and the assumptions about the 
stability of the variances of shocks over time). ASC consistently find, unlike previous 
research, that the transitory price elasticity is much smaller than the persistent price 
elasticity. This pattern is difficult to reconcile with economic theory. For instance, a 
model with habit formation or slow adjustment would suggest that the long-run response 
to a persistent price change should be larger than the response to a temporary price 
change – but there is no reason why the immediate response to the persistent price change 
should be larger. The pattern is also difficult to reconcile with the spike in giving in 1986 
illustrated earlier in Figure 1, which appears to be strong evidence of responsiveness to a   10
transitory difference between current and expected future prices, at least among those 
with very high incomes. 
  The counterintuitive pattern of persistent and transitory price elasticities in ASC 
may arise because their procedure does not deal well with pre-announced and phased-in 
changes in tax law. For instance, there is nothing in the model that explicitly takes into 
account the fact that the large price increases occurring in 1987 and again in 1988 were 
already fully anticipated in 1986. As a result, the ASC technique must treat the large 
negative first-difference of giving between 1986 and 1987 among high income taxpayers 
largely as a response to the persistent increase in observed implemented prices that begins 
in 1987. In fact a large part of the 1986-87 change in giving almost certainly reflects 
inter-temporal substitution into 1986 as contributors responded to the change in price 
before it actually began to be implemented. This would tend to bias the estimated 
persistent price elasticity upwards in absolute value, particularly in data where very high-
income people are overrepresented. The transitory price elasticity in ASC may be biased 
towards zero essentially due to measurement error -- their measure of transitory price 
shock exhibits little independent variation, so that the effective noise-to-signal ratio in 
this variable may be large.  Transitory price shocks arising from transitory income shocks 
are assumed to be a linear function of those income shocks, so that part of the transitory 
price shock exhibits no variation independent from income. Transitory price shocks that 
are unrelated to income shocks must come from tax reforms. But the kind of tax reform 
that would yield a transitory shock to price in the ASC approach would be one that 
changes the price for a single year, and then immediately reverses itself the following 
year – this sort of tax change did not occur during the sample period in question. 
  In what follows, we develop an estimation strategy that takes advantage of the 
improved specification of the stochastic process for income presented in ASC, but that 
assumes that taxpayers take advantage of publicly available information about future 
changes in the nature of the tax system that have already been enacted. Our procedure 
makes efficient use of the highly non-linear ways in which the relationship between 
income and price changed over time. In addition, we strengthen the identification of our 
empirical models by incorporating both federal and state income tax laws – with the 
exception of Feenberg (1987), state income tax variation has not been used in empirical   11
analysis of the effects of income taxes on charitable giving. As a first step we show how 
the ASC approach can be replicated in a multi-step regression framework.  Breaking the 
procedure down into an approximate regression equivalent will help clarify how the 
approach used in ASC compares to the previous literature, which has been exclusively 
regression based. It will also permit us to adapt the procedure to allow for a richer 
specification of how tax laws changed current and expected future prices and incomes 
over time, which we later find to be crucial to reconciling the results of ASC with the rest 
of the literature and to obtaining consistent estimates.   
 
Basic empirical model 
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where ∆git is the change in the natural log of giving by taxpayer i between time t-1 and 
time t, ∆αt is the change in time specific intercept between t-1 and t, ∆p*it and ∆y*it are 





transitory changes in the natural logs of price and disposable income, ∆Xit is the change 
in a vector of demographic characteristics, and ∆νit is an error term.  Throughout the 
paper, all variables are measured in real constant dollars. The equation is first-differenced 
to remove an individual-specific fixed effect that may be correlated with the levels of the 
other explanatory variables. Conceptually, we want ∆p*it and ∆y*it to capture vertical 
shifts in an individual’s whole expected future time path of prices and disposable income 
that were unanticipated before time t, like those illustrated by the shift from line a-b to 
line c-d and the shift from line e-f to line g-h in Figure 1. Ideally, if information becomes 
available at time t that such a shift in the lifetime profile of p and y will occur in the 
future (but will not yet be fully implemented time t), we want to incorporate the expected 
long-run vertical shift illustrated in Figure 1 into ∆p*it and ∆y*it immediately at time t, to 
allow for the possibility that taxpayers begin to respond immediately in anticipation of   12




it then represent the change in actual log price and log 
disposable income between t-1 and t, minus the persistent change in expected log price 
and income that had been unanticipated before time t. So, for example, suppose that there 
is a change in price between time t-1 and time t, but there is no change in the expected 
future path of prices that had been unanticipated before time t. In that case, the full 
change in p represents a “transitory” change in price, in the sense that it arose either due 
to a fluctuation in income that is known by the taxpayer to be transitory, or in the sense 
that the change was already anticipated prior to time t. Either sort of price change 
represents an opportunity for intertemporal substitution.  Similarly, if there is no change 
in current price between t-1 and time t, but there is a positive shock to the expected future 
path of prices at time t, there should be an equal negative shock to ∆p
T
it, reflecting the 
fact that the current price has been made temporarily low relative to the now higher 
expectation of future prices. This would be the case, for example, in 1986, when the 
announcement of TRA86 caused the current price to be temporarily below the expected 
future price, creating an opportunity for intertemporal substitution. If some of the 
responsiveness to prices represents intertemporal substitution, then we should find that 
the coefficient on ∆p
T
it is larger than the coefficient on ∆p*it. Later in the paper, we will 
also consider a more general form of specification that allows lagged changes in giving, 
prices, and incomes to affect subsequent realizations of g. 
 
Replicating the ASC approach in a regression framework 
 
  The ASC approach to estimating equation (1) can be expressed as a system of 
three equations:  
 
(2) ∆yit










R = β1(ωit + a1ξit) + β2[ζit - ζit-1 + a2(ηit - ηit-1)] + β3ξit + β4(ηit-ηit-1)  + ψit +  εit-εit-1  
 =  β1∆pit
* + β2 ∆pit
T + β3 ∆yit
* + β4∆yit





R are the residuals from regressing ∆yit, ∆pit, and ∆git on time dummies 
and the demographic characteristics ∆Xit.
7 ξit, ηit, ωit, ζit, ψit, εit are all zero-mean random 
shocks that are assumed to be independently, identically, and normally distributed. Each 
shock has its own variance, and each variance is assumed to be constant across 
individuals and time (although ASC also test the effects of allowing each variance to 
change over time). In equation (2), ξit is a persistent shock to log disposable income, and 
ηit is a transitory shock to log disposable income that dies off after one period. Thus, 
∆yit
R, is decomposed into a persistent component ∆yit
*, plus a transitory component ∆yit
T, 
where ∆yit
* = ξit, and ∆yit
T = ηit - ηit-1.  In other words, the portion log disposable income 
that cannot not explained by year dummies or demographic / life cycle factors is assumed 
to follow a random walk, with a white noise transitory fluctuation around that random 
walk.  
  In equation (3), ωit is a persistent shock to p that is independent of income, ζit is a 
transitory shock to p that that is independent of income and dies off after one period, and 
a1 and a2 are coefficients that represent the marginal effect on price of each shock to 
income. Thus, ASC assume that the total change in residual log price ∆pit
R consists of a 
persistent component ∆pit
*, which includes an independent persistent price shock ωit and 
a linear function of the persistent income shock, a1ξit, plus a transitory component ∆pit
T, 
which depends on independent transitory price shocks ζit - ζit-1 and a linear function of 
the transitory income shock, a2(ηit - ηit-1).  Equation (4) is just another representation of 
equation (1), where the effects of time dummies and the variables in ∆Xit have already 
been partialed out of the remaining variables. The top row of equation (4) shows how the 





T. Finally, ASC assume that the error term in the giving equation, ∆νit, can further be 
decomposed into a persistent shock ψit, and the first difference of a transitory shocks εit-
εit-1. 
 The  parameters  a1, a2, β1, β2, β3, and β4 are estimated by ASC in a minimum-
distance estimator framework. The values of these parameters, together with equations 
(2), (3), and (4), imply particular values for the variances and covariances of ∆yit
R, ∆pit





R. The minimum distance estimator chooses values of the 
parameters to minimize the difference between the variances and covariances predicted 
by the model, and those observed in the sample. 
  Instead of relying on the covariance structure estimation approach used in ASC, 
their procedure can alternatively be broken down in to a series of simple ordinary least 
squares regressions if one is able to decompose income and price into estimated 
transitory and permanent components at the individual level.  It is possible to do so in a 
way that is consistent with the assumptions of the ASC model by applying a “filtering” 
technique from the macroeconometric literature. The filtering method we use is closely 
related to the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, which is commonly used in the real business 
cycle literature, for example to distinguish the cyclical component of GDP from its long-
run trend component. The HP filter assumes that a variable yt follows an I(2) persistent 
trend (in other words, the trend follows a random walk), with a transitory component 
made up of pure white noise around that trend.  In the HP filter, the permanent trend 
component yt* is chosen to minimize  
(5)  ∑ ∑ − ∆ − ∆ + −
2 *
1
* 2 * ) ( ) ( t t t t y y y y λ , 
where λ is a parameter that determines the smoothness of estimated path of ∆yt*. As the 
smoothing parameter λ gets larger, permanent income becomes smoother, approaching a 
constant linear trend. Hodrick and Prescott (1997, p. 4) note that if the transitory and 
permanent shocks are independently, identically, and normally distributed (as is assumed 
in ASC), then the optimal value for λ is the ratio of the variances of the transitory shock 
to the variance of the persistent shock.  Intuitively, when the variance of transitory shocks 
is large and the variance of persistent shocks is small, then the true path of the persistent 
component will be fairly smooth, rarely diverging from its existing path to any great 
extent. In that case, if λ is appropriately set to equal the ratio of transitory to permanent 
variances, more weight will be put on minimizing the estimated squared permanent 
shocks, and the filter will produce a smoother time-series for the permanent component. 
  In order to be consistent with the ASC assumptions about the stochastic process 
for income, it is straightforward to modify the HP filter to suit an I(1) process for residual 
permanent income (in other words, the part of log permanent income that cannot be 
explained by other factors follows a random walk in levels), again with a white noise   15
component for transitory fluctuations in income.  To decompose the residual component 
of yit
R into transitory and permanent components, the filter is applied to each individual 
time series separately, and yit
* is chosen to minimize: 




it it it it t yy yy λ − −+ − ∑ , 
where λ is set equal to the ratio of the estimated variance of the transitory shock to the 
estimated variance of permanent shock, that is, ση
2 /σξ
2. Since we do not know the true 
variances, we use estimates from the sample as a whole, which is appropriate for 
replicating the versions of the ASC estimator where variances are assumed to be constant 
across both individuals and time. ASC show that under the assumptions of their model, 
Var(∆yit
R) =  σξ




2.  Under those assumptions, we can 
obtain sample estimates of the variances needed to construct λ by calculating:  




2 ˆξ σ  = Var(∆yit
R) - 2
2 ˆη σ .   
In all of our models, λ is estimated to be in the vicinity of 0.7.
 8 Since this procedure 
involves precisely the same assumptions about the stochastic process for income and the 
structure of variances and covariances as in ASC, it achieves the same decomposition of 
income into transitory and permanent components as is implicitly occurring in the ASC 
approach.
9   




First, regress the levels of yit, pit, and git on year dummies, Xit, and an individual-specific 
fixed effect.
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STEP 2: 
Next, we use our filter on each individual time series of yit
R to estimate
**
1 ˆ ˆˆ it it it yy ξ − =− . 
Once we have ˆ
it ξ , we can construct an estimate of the first-difference of transitory 
shocks,  1 ˆ ˆˆ ()
R




Again pool the data and use OLS to estimate: 
(7) ∆pit
R = a1 it ξ ˆ   + a2( 1 ˆ ˆ − − it it η η )  + uit 
This is just equation (3) above with the estimated permanent and transitory income 
shocks substituted for their true values. The residual from this regression, uit, equals ωt + 
ζt - ζt-1. We then estimate ωt and (ζt - ζt-1) with the filter, using the same approach as for 
income above (it is necessary, but straightforward, to integrate the uit’s for an individual 
into a series of levels in order to apply the filter). 
 
STEP 4: 
Finally, estimate equation (4) by linear regression. Because of step 2 and step 3, we now 
know everything on the right hand side of equation (4) except for β1, β2, β3, and β4, 
which are the coefficients (also elasticities) that we are estimating now via linear 
regression, and the error term in the giving equation. Our replication procedure thus far 
does not address the structure of the error term in the giving equation assumed by ACS, 
but does compute standard errors that are robust to arbitrary forms of autocorrelation (and 
heteroskedasticity). 
 
Incorporating a richer specification of tax law 
 
  Our new estimation procedure builds upon the ASC specification of a stochastic 
process for income, but differs from their approach in several key ways.  We assume that 
it is Yit
R, the natural log of pre-tax income (after partialing out the effects of variables in 
Xit, a time-trend, and an individual specific fixed effect) that follows the stochastic   17
process specified in ASC for log after-tax income yit.
11 In other words, we now specify 
that ∆Yit
R = ξit +  (ηit - ηit-1). We then construct estimates of transitory and persistent 
changes in yit and pit by combining the estimated information about the transitory and 
permanent components of pre-tax income with detailed information on actual tax laws 
known at time t and time t-1. A particularly important advantage of our approach here is 
that we can address the issue of pre-announced and phased-in changes in tax law by using 
the fully-phased in version of currently announced steady-state future tax law to construct 
estimates of expected future price and disposable income.  
  Another advantage of our approach is that it allows shocks to pre-tax income to 
affect tax liability and tax rates in different ways depending on the specifics of the actual 
tax law applying to that individual at that time. By estimating a1 and a2 as fixed 
coefficients, ASC implicitly impose the restriction that a shock to income of a given size 
always has the same marginal effect on price across all individuals in all time periods. In 
fact, the marginal effect of an income shock on price can vary greatly across individuals 
and time, as the relationship is determined by the complicated non-linear tax bracket 
structure, which varies over time (due to tax reforms) and across states and filing statuses, 
and also depends on where one’s taxable income is located in the tax bracket structure, 
which varies across individuals.   
  An additional important consideration arises because ASC find that in models 
where the variance of shocks is assumed to be constant over time, the estimated persistent 
price elasticity is quite sensitive to the sample period chosen. They suggest that the 
instability of the parameter estimates arises because of the assumption of constant 
variances over time – in particular, they argue that tax reforms during the 1980s greatly 
reduced the variance of shocks to price, by compressing the marginal rate distribution. 
When they relax this assumption and allow variances to change over time, the price 
elasticity estimates become more stable over different sample periods, and uniformly 
large, while other elasticities are not much affected. Although we do not yet allow non-
stationary variances in our procedure, we address the concern motivating the non-
stationarity assumption more directly, because in our approach shocks to income are fed 
through the actual tax rate schedules themselves in order to determine their effects on 
price. Thus, the effects of compressing the rate distribution are accounted for directly and   18
precisely, rather than assuming that this effect can be approximated through a changing 
variance structure. 
  Our specific procedure for estimating equation (1) above can be broken down into 
four steps.   
 
STEP 1 
Regress log pre-tax income on an individual-specific fixed effect (αi), a time trend (t), 
and the vector of demographic and life cycle characteristics (Xit). The first stage 
regression equation is Yit = γAit, where Ait = [αi | t |  Xit]. The residual from this 
regression is ˆR
it Y . 
 
STEP 2 
Run each individual time-series of  ˆR
it Y  through the filter in order to estimate
* ˆ





Use the information above, in conjunction with information about tax law known at time 
t and time t-1, to construct estimates of the transitory and persistent changes in price and 
disposable income at time t.  We will label these constructed estimates 
* ˆit p ∆ ,  ˆ
T
it p ∆ , 
* ˆit y ∆  
and ˆ
T
it y ∆ . It will be useful to define yt(Yit,Zit) and pt(Yit,Zit) as general functions that map 
the log of pre-tax income Yit, and a vector of other individual characteristics Zit, into log 
after-tax income and log price. The vector of other characteristics entering tax 
calculations, Zit, is defined to include tax-relevant demographic characteristics such as 
age, marital status, number of dependents, and state of residence, as well as information 
on the allocation of pre-tax income across various components of income and deductions, 
expressed as shares of pre-tax income. An “S” superscript indicates a “steady state” 
function, that is, the function that is expected to apply after currently announced tax law 
is fully phased in, based on information available at the relevant date. So, for example, 
yt
S(.) and pt
S(.) represent the functions that would map Yit and Zit into log after-tax 
income and log price based on steady state tax law that is known as of time t. Similarly, 
yt-1
S(.) and pt-1
S(.) represent the equivalent functions based on steady state tax law known   19
as of time t-1. For federal taxes, we assume that in years when a new tax law is enacted 
or when a recently enacted law is being gradually phased-in, known steady-state tax law 
is the fully-phased in version of that newly or recently enacted law. In other years, steady 
state federal law is assumed to be currently applicable law. In the absence of detailed 
information on the legislative histories of various state tax reforms, we assume that for 
state taxes, steady state law known at time t is the law that applies in year t+1. 
  Our goal in constructing the estimates of persistent changes in price and 
disposable income 
* ˆit p ∆  and 
* ˆit y ∆ , is to isolate long-run vertical shifts in the whole 
expected future profile of prices and disposable income that become known at time t and 
had not been anticipated before then, as illustrated in Figure 1.  In our model this sort of 
shift arises for two reasons: an unanticipated persistent shock to income ξit; and a tax 
reform that becomes known at time t and which changes the expected steady-state future 
tax function in a persistent manner. Note that ξit affects disposable income directly, and 
also indirectly through its influence on tax liability. It also affects price to the extent that 
it pushes the taxpayer into a different marginal rate bracket. This is all subsumed in the 
functions that map Y and Z into p and y. In order to isolate these two sources of 
previously unanticipated persistent shocks, we construct estimates of 
* ˆit p ∆  and 
* ˆit y ∆  that 
change only because of  it ξ

 and any changes in the pt
S and yt
S functions that become 
known between time t-1 and time t, holding all other characteristics constant at their t-1 
levels.
12 Thus we construct: 
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  Transitory changes in price and income between time t and time t-1 are just the 










it it it p pp ∆= ∆− ∆  
 
  These transitory components include changes in price caused by transitory 
fluctuations in income, predictable changes caused by life cycle and demographic factors, 
and changes in the difference between current and expected future prices and incomes 
caused by pre-announced changes in tax law. As an example of the latter, suppose that a 
persistent 10 percent increase in price that is implemented beginning at time t+1 is 
announced at time t, and there is no change in current price between t-1 and t. In that 
case, there will be a positive shock of approximately 0.1 to 
* ˆit p ∆ , and a corresponding 
shock of -0.1 to  ˆ
T
it p ∆ . The effects of the two shocks can be distinguished because in the 
next period, 
* ˆit p ∆  will be zero and  ˆ
T
it p ∆  will be +0.1. Intuitively, the portion of the change 
in giving at time t that reverses itself at time t+1 contributes to the estimate of the effect 
of the transitory price change, while the portion of the change at time t that does not 
reverse itself at t+1 contributes to the estimate of the effect of the persistent price change. 
  Changes in price or income that are driven by predictable life cycle and 
demographic factors are largely controlled for in any event through ∆Xit, but these factors 
may induce some residual independent variation in p and y because the latter are 
complicated non-linear functions of many of the components of ∆Xit. To the extent that 
the influences of these factors are not absorbed by controlling for ∆Xit, we want them to 
be relegated to the transitory components of price and income, because they are likely to 
be a source of predictable differences in price across time, and thus the response to them 
may reflect intertemporal substitution. This procedure achieves that. 
 
STEP 4: 
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Instrumental variables 
 
  While the estimation procedure outlined above has many advantages, one 
potential concern is that, although our estimated decomposition of persistent and 
transitory components should be correct on average if our assumptions about the 
stochastic process for income are correct, there will inevitably be errors in the 
decomposition for particular individuals and years. This is difficult to avoid when the 
variables we are interested in are unobservable. One method to address any potential 
biases that might occur due to this measurement error problem is to use instrumental 
variables that rely entirely on tax reforms for identification. Tax reforms are likely to be 
exogenous from the perspective of the individual, and their effects on price and income 
can be decomposed into transitory and permanent components with greater certainty than 
can pre-tax income. That is because the changes in current and future tax law caused by 
tax reforms were published and known with relative certainty, while the portion of any 
change in pre-tax income that is transitory or permanent cannot be known with certainty. 
In this approach, we treat 
* ˆit p ∆ ,  ˆ
T
it p ∆ , 
* ˆit y ∆  and  ˆ
T
it y ∆  as measurements with error of their 
true values. The excluded instruments we use here are: 
 
(13)   ) , ˆ ˆ ( ) , ˆ ˆ ( 1 1
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Here the functions pt(·,·) and yt(·,·) use current tax law, rather than the fully-phased in tax 
law.  These instruments isolate the portion of changes in transitory and permanent price 
and income that are caused by tax reforms, holding life-cycle and persistent components 
of income and the characteristics in Z constant at their t-1 levels.  Note that equations   22
(13) and (15) will only be non-zero in years when tax reforms are announced, and 
equations (14) and (16) will only be non-zero in years when current tax law differs in a 
systematic way from known future tax law due to a pre-announced or gradually phased-in 
tax reform.  As an example, in 1986, the instrument for transitory price change will be the 
price calculated using the 1988 tax function minus the price calculated using the 1986 tax 
function, both evaluated at time t-1 levels of persistent and life-cycle income and 
characteristics in Zit. 
 
Data for preliminary empirical analysis 
 
Our preliminary empirical work on this subject utilizes the 1979-90 University of 
Michigan public-use panel of individual tax returns. The panel consists of a random 
sample of tax returns selected based on the last four digits of the social security number. 
We follow ASC closely in sample selection and variable definition. The sample includes 
those who were exogenous itemizers (would have itemized even with zero charitable 
giving), and had income above the filing threshold, for at least five consecutive years 
without a change in marital status. We exclude members of married couples who file 
their federal income taxes separately (a very rare occurrence) and returns filed for a prior 
tax year. Our definition of income, which follows Auten Cilke and Randolph (1992), 
begins with adjusted gross income, and makes a number of modifications to keep the 
measure consistent across time, most notably by adding back in any excluded capital 
gains realizations. The resulting sample has 26,012 observations, or 22,844 after 
dropping the first year of data for each individual due to first-differencing.  
 Variables  in  Xit in the public use data include number of dependents, and whether 
the taxpayer or spouse are aged 65 or over, whether the return reported wage and salary 
income, whether the return reported self-employment income, whether the taxpayer has 
any children.
13 In addition, each of these dummies, as well as a dummy for marital status, 
are interacted with time trends. Thus, most demographic variables are allowed to cause a 
discrete shift in the dependent variable when they change, and are allowed to affect the 
trend in the dependent variable as well. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of 
charitable donations plus $10 (to avoid taking the log of zero).   23
  All tax liabilities and tax rates are computed using a very detailed federal and 
state income tax calculator which is described in Bakija (2004).
14  Following ASC, tax 
variables are calculated setting charitable giving equal to 1 percent of pre-tax income, to 
avoid endogeneity (we also tried using this as an instrument for the values calculated 
using actual charitable giving, and found that it made little difference to the results).  
Marginal tax rates are then calculated based on a $0.10 increase in charitable donation 
above that level.
15 As is the convention in the literature, we define the price so that it 
includes the extra tax savings that occur through the avoidance of capital gains tax on 
donations of appreciated property. We also take into account that between 1987 and 1992 
such capital gains would be taxed by the alternative minimum tax should the taxpayer 
become subject to it.  We define:  
pit = ln{1-mtrt-0.5*(ncshare)*[mtrcgit
S -mtrait]}, 
where mtrt is the marginal income tax rate at which charity is deducted, mtrcgit
S is the 
steady-state marginal income tax rate on capital gains realizations, mtrait is marginal rate 
of alternative minimum tax on capital gains on gifts of appreciated assets (equal zero if 
not subject to AMT), and ncshare is the average ratio of non-cash charitable gifts to total 
charitable gifts from 1979-88 for all taxpayers in the real income class of which this 
particular taxpayer is a member, from Auten, Cilke, and Randoph (1992, pp. 282-283). 
The 0.5 is the rule-of thumb ratio of the present value of capital gains realizations to 
accrued capital gains, times the gain-to-value ratio for gifts of appreciated assets, 
estimated by Feldstein (1975) and Feldstein and Clotfelter (1976), which has been used 
throughout the literature. Note that the expected future steady marginal capital gains tax 
rate (mtrcgit
S) is the relevant capital gains tax rate here, as the choice is between giving an 
appreciated asset to charity today, or realizing the gain on the asset at some unspecified 
point in the future. 
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Preliminary results 
 
  Table 1 shows preliminary results from estimating each of the models discussed 
above, as well as some more traditional models for purposes of comparison.  Row (1) 
depicts estimates from a conventional (pooled) cross-sectional regression, where no 
attempt is made to distinguish transitory from permanent variation in price or income nor 
to deal with unobserved heterogeneity. The price elasticity is -1.22 and the income 
elasticity is 0.84 – both are quite typical of results found in the traditional cross-sectional 
literature. Row (2) takes the same approach, but now first differences the data to control 
for unobserved heterogeneity. Both elasticities are substantially reduced, to -0.45 for 
price and 0.28 for income. This is also broadly consistent with the findings of previous 
studies that analyzed early years of this same data set, e.g., Broman (1989) and Barrett, 
McGuirk, and Steinberg (1997). 
  Rows (3) and (4) show elasticities reported in ASC for the two specifications and 
sample periods that are closest to our replication. As noted above, their persistent price 
elasticity estimates are sensitive to the sample period when the variances of the shocks 
are constrained to be constant over time. Their transitory price elasticity estimates are 
consistently low, and substantially lower than their persistent price elasticity estimates.  
Row (5) shows the results of our replication of their approach using a multi-step method 
on the public-use data. The basic pattern of results in the replication is reasonably similar 
to what ASC find, considering the differences in sample period and composition of 
sample. In particular, the replication reproduces the odd result that the persistent price 
elasticity (-0.64) is larger than the transitory price elasticity (-0.34). 
  Row (6) shows the results of implementing our new estimation procedure (from 
equation 12 above), which combines the ASC stochastic process with income with a 
more precise modeling of tax law information, particularly with regards to pre-announced 
and phased-in changes. We find that our approach undoes the counterintuitive pattern of 
price elasticities found by ASC, as the persistent price elasticity falls from -0.64 to -0.24, 
and the transitory price elasticity rises slightly, to -0.4. This is consistent with our prior 
expectation that failure to model pre-announced changes in tax law, particularly with 
respect to TRA86, would bias the persistent price elasticity upwards. Because the   25
transitiory elasticity is now larger than the persistent price elasticity, our results suggest 
that there is some degree of intertemporal substitution of charitable giving, although the 
responsiveness still appears to be rather small. We suspect that intertemporal substitution 
may not be an especially large issue in the public use data set, which largely consists of 
middle class taxpayers, but is likely to be a bigger issue among the high income taxpayers 
in the ASC data set, as evidenced by the large 1986 spike in Figure 1. We also find that 
our new procedure increases the estimated elasticity of giving with respect to persistent 
changes in income to 0.72, and that the transitory income elasticity is essentially zero. If 
people behave according to the permanent income hypothesis, this would suggest that our 
procedure is doing a relatively good job of separating out persistent and transitory 
components of income. 
  Row (7) shows the results of estimating the instrumental variables approach 
described above on the public-use data. The main changes are that the transitory price 
elasticity becomes a bit larger at -0.56, and the persistent income elasticity falls to 0.27. 
The public use data set’s small sample size, particularly with regards to high income 
people who experienced the most interesting changes in tax law during this period, limits 
what we can learn from this exercise, as the standard errors are quite large. Nonetheless, 
the fact that the point estimate the persistent price elasticity barely changes under the IV 





  A next step is to make the model more dynamic, allowing lagged values of giving, 
price, and income variables to enter the equation. That allows for slow adjustment by 
taxpayers, which would mean that the long-run elasticities with respect to persistent price 
and income changes might be larger than the immediate effects we estimated above. In 
addition, if intertemporal substitution is an important part of the story, then including 
lagged dependent and explanatory variables would be appropriate. For instance, if there is 
intertemporal substitution of giving into 1986 in response to the expected future increase 
in price caused by TRA86, one would expect this to reduce giving in future years relative   26
to what it otherwise would have been, ceteris paribus. It makes sense to include lags of 
the price and income variables as well as lagged giving because the effect of a change in 
lagged giving should depend on the reason it occurred.  For instance, if giving was large 
last year because of intertemporal substitution from this year to last in response to a 
temporarily low price, then we would expect that surge in giving to increase giving this 
year. On the other hand, if the increase in giving last period was because it was the first 
year of a persistent reduction in price, and there is slow adjustment to the new permanent 
price, then we might expect the increase last period to be associated with an increase this 
period. 
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In this specification, the long-run elasticity of giving with respect to a permanent change 
in price is (δ1 + δ5)/(1-δ9), and the long-run elasticity of giving with respect to a 
permanent change in disposable income is (δ3 + δ7)/(1-δ9). The effects of one-period 
shocks to the transitory variables converge to zero in the long-run.
16 
    It is well known that in the first-differenced equation (17) will suffer from 
endogeneity bias, because ∆vit depends in part on vit, which is correlated with git-1. This 
would tend to bias our estimate of δ9 downward,   Additional endogeneity problems arise 
with a lagged dependent variable if there is serial correlation in vit.  In order to address 
these problems in an efficient manner, we use the instrumental variables approach 
developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), which is sometimes referred to as “difference 
GMM.”
17 The Arellano Bond test for autocorrelation finds evidence of first- and second-
order autocorrelation, but rejects higher orders of autocorrelation. Thus all available 
lagged levels git from periods t-3 and earlier are used as instruments for ∆git-1. In addition, 
based on equation (17) above, lagged values of ∆Xit from periods t-1 to t-3, as well as 
lagged values of 
* ˆit p ∆ ,  ˆ
T
it p ∆ , 
* ˆit y ∆ ,  ˆ
T
it y ∆  from t-2 and t-3 should be correlated with ∆git-1, 
either directly or through their correlation with ∆git-2, so these are used as instruments for   27
∆git-1 in any periods when they are available.  We use the two-step version of this 
estimator, which uses initial consistent estimates of the error term from equation (17) 
above ( ˆit ν ) to construct an optimal weighting matrix for GMM, which improves 
efficiency, and we compute standard errors that are robust to arbitrary forms of 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The finite-sample bias in the two-step standard 
errors is corrected using the procedure outlined in Windmeijer (2000). We also try an 
instrumental variables approach, where instruments depending entirely on tax reforms for 
identification, as outlined in equations (13) through (16) above, are used for current and 
lagged values of the price and disposable income variables. 
  Results from the dynamic Arellano Bond estimator are shown in Table 2. The top 
panel depicts the conventional estimates (which do not instrument for the price and 
income variables). The estimates support the notion that there is some degree of slow 
adjustment and/or habit formation in the data, as the elasticity of current giving with 
respect to one-period lagged giving is found to be 0.36 and highly statistically significant. 
The long-run elasticity of giving with respect to a persistent shock to price is estimated to 
be -0.75, and the long run persistent income elasticity is 0.56.  The transitory price 
elasticity continues to be somewhat higher than the immediate elasticity of giving with 
respect to a persistent price change, but is now lower than the long-run effect. Results 
from the version which instruments for price and disposable income changes are quite 
similar in the long run effects and in the short run price elasticities, except for a 




  In this paper we develop a new estimation procedure for analyzing the effect of 
the income tax on charitable giving. It combines a comparatively unrestrictive stochastic 
process for income with a method for addressing anticipated changes in tax law arising 
from pre-announcement. We find that taking into account the pre-announced and phased-
in nature of tax reforms has an important effect on the results, reducing the persistent 
price elasticity substantially and raising the transitory price elasticity slightly, so that the 
latter is again larger than the former. At the same time, we do not find particularly strong   28
evidence of intertemporal substitution of charitable giving in response to anticipated price 
variation, at least in a small public use data set consistng largely of middle-class 
households. We then estimate an Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data model that allows 
for gradual adjustment of giving and habit formation, and we find that the long-run 
responses to persistent price changes are larger than the immediate responses. The net 
result is a long-run persistent price elasticity in the vicinity of -0.75.  29
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(6) Estimation of equation (12) 









(7) Instrumental variables relying 











Standard errors robust to arbitrary forms of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity 
reported in parentheses. Results in italics are directly from Auten, Sieg, and Clotfelter 
(2002), presented here for purposes of comparison. 
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Table 2 – Elasticity estimates from Arellano Bond dynamic specification (equation 17) 
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giving 



















































Standard errors robust to arbitrary forms of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, with 
Windmeijer finite sample bias correction, reported in parentheses. Standard errors for the 
long-run elasticities, which are non-linear functions of coefficients, are approximated via 
the delta method.  31
Figure 1 – Stylized illustration of transitory, permanent, and life-cycle variation in 
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Source: Auten, Cilke, and Randolph (1992)
Figure 2 -- Charitable contributions as a percentage of 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 See Aprill (2001) 
 
2 The original “Treasury I” plan that led to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 would have disallowed deductions 
for charitable contributions that were below 2 percent of income (Birnbaum and Murray, 1987, p. 90). The 
Hall and Rabushka (1995) call for the elimination of charitable deductions in their “flat tax” plan. 
 
3 See Auten, Cilke, and Randolph (1992) for a thorough description of the changes in tax law that occurred 
between 1981 and 1991, and how they affected incentives to give to charity. 
 
4 See Brown (1997) for a recent literature review. 
  
5 In the expenditure share equation approach used by Randolph, the elasticity of giving varies depending on 
the size of the expenditure share. The most commonly cited results for Randolph evaluate the elasticity at 
the giving-weighted mean expenditure share of 0.085, which produces a permanent price elasticity of -0.58 
and a transitory price elasticity of -1.55. However, for reasons discussed in detail in Bakija (2002), the 
elasticity evaluated at the mean expenditure share (0.039) is likely to be more representative of the 
elasticity of aggregate giving with respect to price in the sample. 
 
6 The long-run effect is the immediate effect divided by (1-γ), where γ is the coefficient on lagged giving. A 
small value of γ thus implies that the long-run effect is not much larger than the immediate effect. Also note 
that when the number of time periods is relatively small, a fixed effects estimator is inconsistent when a 
lagged dependent variable enters the specification as an explanatory variable, because differencing the 
current error term from its time-mean introduces a correlation between that error term and the time-mean 
differenced lagged dependent variable. As a result, when we later estimate a dynamic version of our model 
which includes a lagged dependent variable, we first difference the data. See Bond (2002) for an overview 
of the issues involved.  
 
7 The demographic characteristics in ASC’s ∆Xit vector include a third-order polynomial in age, as well as 
dummy variables for each of: receipt of wage or salary income, receipt of self-employment income, 
married, head of household, retired, and whether the taxpayer has children.  Thus, the underlying level 
variables in Xit would include, for example, each of the dummy variables interacted with a time trend, and a 




R) is positive, or if it is negative but is larger than .5*Var(∆yt
R) in absolute value, then 
the estimate of either σξ
2 or ση
2 would be negative. This would suggest an obvious violation of the 
assumptions of the model.  This problem did not arise in our estimation. 
 
9 Permanent income is found by calculating y* = B
-1y
R, where y* is a vector including yit
* for each period 
and y
R is a vector including yit





























10 ASC remove the individual-specific fixed effect in this first stage by differencing. We estimate this first 
stage by fixed effects because it will become useful later in our own estimation procedure to be able to 
reconstruct the level of income predicted by this regression. In our replication of ASC, we tried doing the 
first stage regressions both ways and found the results to be nearly identical. 
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11 We use a time trend rather than year dummies here because the coefficients on the year dummies will 
partly reflect aggregate transitory fluctuations in income, and we want our predicted values from the first 
stage regressions to capture only the smooth component of income that is largely predictable in advance 
based on life cycle and demographic considerations, the individual-specific intercept, and economy-wide 
productivity trends. In the final stage regressions, we control for year dummies separately, so this should 
not make much difference. 
 
12 A case could be made that we actually want to evaluate the vertical shift in the expected future profile of 
prices and disposable incomes holding other characteristics constant at their expected future levels. A 
difficulty is that many of those future characteristics are unknown at time t (although some, such as age, are 
clearly known in advance). The idea behind holding characteristics constant at their t-1 levels is that the 
size of the vertical shift in the profile will be approximately the same whether we use last year’s values of 
other characteristics, or values from a few years hence. Since we are trying to measure the vertical distance 
of an approximately parallel shift in the profile, holding these characteristics constant matters more than 
which particular year they are chosen from. 
 
13 Marital status is not included because, given our sample selection method, it does not change over time 
for an individual, and thus is collinear with the fixed effect (or always zero after first differencing). 
 
14 Although state of residence is omitted for returns with AGI above $200,000 in the public use panel, in 
the vast majority of cases we were able to impute state of residence based on the observed state in years 
when the taxpayer had an AGI below $200,000. In cases where the taxpayer’s AGI is never below 
$200,000, we treat the taxpayer as if he or she lived in a state without an income tax. Less than 0.4 percent 
of observations fall into this category. One complication is that in some states, married filing separately is 
advantageous, in which case tax liability and tax rates can depend on the division of income between 
spouses. Since our data do not provide information on the division of income between spouses (except, in 
some cases, for labor income in years when the two-earner credit was in effect), we assume that in married 
couples, 80 percent of labor and business income is earned by the primary taxpayer and 20 percent is 
earned by the spouse, while other income is assumed to be divided 50-50. 
 
15 In the event that a “notch” producing an unusually large marginal tax rate is encountered, the marginal 
rate is recalculated by subtracting $0.10 from the initial value. 
16 The long-run change in the level of log giving in response to a one unit unanticipated persistent shock to 
log price is δ1 + δ1δ9 +  δ5 + (δ1δ9 +  δ5) δ9 + (δ1δ9 +  δ5) δ9
2 + ... = () () / ( 1 ) 0 55 19 1 9
j
j δ δδ δ δ δ ∞ += + − ∑ = . 
The long-run effect on the level of giving of a one unit shock to log price occurring at time t=1 that is 
recognized as transitory and which lasts only one period is: δ2 + δ2δ9 - δ2 +  δ6 + (δ2δ9  - δ2 +  δ6) δ9 - δ6 + 
((δ6δ9 - δ2 + δ6)δ9 - δ6) δ9 + ..., which gradually converges to zero. 
 
17 We implement this estimator using the “xtabond2” program developed for Stata by Roodman (2004). 
The Arellano Bond estimator essentially treats the estimation problem as a system of separate equations for 
each time period, with coefficients in each final stage equation constrained to be common across the 
equations. The system of equations approach allows differing numbers of instruments to be used to predict 
the lagged dependent variable in each equation. This increases efficiency because it allows larger numbers 
of lags of the instruments to be included in the later periods, information that would otherwise be thrown 
away in conventional two stage least squares. The system is estimated by generalized method of moments.  